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Articles
“The World Crisis” (3): Antwerp—Folly or Success?
- By RICHARD M. LANGWORTH
- | February 13, 2024
- Category: Books
Hillsdale Dialogues: The World Crisis
continued from The World Crisis (2)
The Hillsdale Dialogues are weekly broadcasts of discussions between Hillsdale College President Larry P. Arnn and commentator Hugh Hewitt. They are engaged in an extended discussion of Churchill’s The World Crisis: his classic memoir of the First World War. Written contributions to the discussion accompany the Dialogues. This conversation coincides with Chapter 15 “Antwerp” and Chapter 16 “The Channel Ports” in the original Volume I. To search for all published essays to date, click here.
Audio: World Crisis Dialogue 14: Churchill and Antwerp.
Antwerp under siege
Churchill’s role in the defense of Antwerp, as the Germans drove south in 1914, has long been a feature of his “piratical” adventures. The historian Max Hastings called it “a shocking folly by a minister who abused his powers and betrayed his responsibilities. It is astonishing that [his] cabinet colleagues so readily forgave him for a lapse of judgment that would have destroyed most men’s careers.”1
To oppose the Germans in Antwerp, Hastings continues, Churchill “assembled a hotchpotch of Royal Marines and surplus naval personnel…his own private army.” Then he “abandoned his post at the Admiralty” and “had himself appointed Britain’s plenipotentiary to the beleaguered fortress.”2
In their Hillsdale Dialogues discussion in February 2024, Dr. Arnn and Mr. Hewitt go a long way to correct this impression. The following accompaniment to their comments is taken from the writer’s book Winston Churchill, Myth and Reality: What He Really Did and Said (McFarland, 2017).
The Royal Naval Division
Before the First World War, Churchill had opposed conscription (“the draft”). Soon after it started, he became convinced that more men would be needed for victory. As head of the navy, he considered what contribution the Admiralty could make. Upon the declaration of war, there was a surplus of some 20-30,000 Royal Navy reservists not needed aboard ships. Churchill proposed that some of these be organized into one marine and two naval brigades for operations on land.3
With the addition of the two naval brigades—and with cabinet approval—the Royal Naval Division was organized on 16 August 1914. “Its men regarded Churchill as their patron,” Martin Gilbert wrote. “Later, in action, when things went well, they called themselves ‘Churchill’s Pets.’ When things went badly they were known as ‘Churchill’s Innocent Victims.’”4
The Royal Naval Division was approved by the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener. Immediately, Churchill was besieged by associates to make places for their relatives. The Conservative leader Andrew Bonar Law wrote on behalf of his two nephews. Ironically, Bonar Law and others like him would later be among Churchill’s leading critics.
The RND first saw action at Ostend, where two battalions of marines were landed temporarily to secure the city during the allied retreat. It is quite true, as critics said, that naval personnel were not ideal for shore operations. But Kitchener never visualized the RND as a source of first-line troops. Rather, it was an auxiliary force to be landed and used temporarily when regular troops were unavailable.
The decision to defend Antwerp
Churchill’s “piratical adventure” in Antwerp’s defense was actually that of the unanimous British Cabinet. As Churchill had predicted,5 the Germans had made rapid advances in the opening weeks of the war. They secured Brussels, the capital, and by the end of September 1914 were threatening Antwerp, one of Belgium’s last lines of defense. The Belgians informed their allies that Antwerp would have to surrender by 3 October. The British Cabinet said: not so fast.
Lord Kitchener—backed by the Cabinet—emphasized the importance of holding Antwerp long enough to transfer troops and equipment to safer ports farther south. Meanwhile, Antwerp would pose a barrier to the enemy’s line of advance. Kitchener feared that if the Germans reached Calais, they might be able to launch an invasion of Britain. Churchill supported him, since one of the Admiralty’s prime duties was to keep the Channel ports open for movements of troops and materiel. The Cabinet agreed that “the more troops [the Germans] would be forced to divert to the siege…the more coastline would remain in Allied hands.”6
“A discourse the Belges have never heard before”
Foreign Minister Lord Grey told the Belgians that Britain would make a “further effort” to defend Antwerp. At Churchill’s suggestion, Kitchener sent a RND marine brigade, which was nearby in Dunkirk. Meanwhile the French government, in emergency session at Bordeaux, promised to send two territorial (reserve) divisions, artillery and cavalry. The French also promised to launch an offensive toward Lille that would pressure the Germans from another direction. Some questioned the effectiveness of territorials—yet they were the same kind of troops the Germans were using, and in substantial numbers (60,000).7
Kitchener wished to deploy regular army troops at Antwerp, but the information at his disposal was vague. His eye fell upon Churchill, who on October 2nd was en route to Dunkirk to evaluate the marine brigade and consult with the British commander, Sir John French. Kitchener stopped Churchill’s train and returned it to London. There, with Lord Grey and the First Sea Lord, Prince Louis of Battenberg, they agreed to send Churchill to Antwerp to report the situation. Churchill did not, therefore, “have himself appointed.”
Neither is it true that Churchill “abandoned his post.” He left Battenberg in charge at the Admiralty, under direction of Prime Minister Asquith. Asquith and Kitchener anxiously awaited Churchill’s report, Asquith with gusto: “I don’t know how fluent he is in French, but if he was able to do himself justice in a foreign tongue, the Belges will have listened to a discourse the like of which they have never heard before.”8
“Churchill’s Private Army”
Nor did Churchill favor or authorize any “hotchpotch collections of naval personnel,” including recruits, that showed up at Antwerp. Kitchener had planned to send a “substantial” Antwerp relief force under the command of Sir Henry Rawlinson to take over the defense. They could not be sent immediately, so Kitchener accepted Churchill’s suggestion of the marine brigade, supplemented by two naval brigades from the Royal Naval Division. Critics referred to this as “Churchill’s private army.”
Asquith at least knew the truth. He had explained to the King that in the present emergency, there were no other troops available to support Antwerp’s defense. Asquith also knew that
on October 4, in his telegram to Kitchener, Churchill had explicitly requested the Naval Brigades to be sent, “minus recruits”; all subsequent arrangements for the despatch of the brigades had been made at the Admiralty by Prince Louis…. The recruits could easily have been held back had Prince Louis or Asquith desired. When, on October 5, Churchill found that the brigades had come with their recruits, and were about to be exposed to the full weight of a German assault, he had given immediate orders for them to take up a less exposed, defensive position. (Italics added.)9
These facts were not made public at the time. Clearly, they have engendered the venomous accounts of Churchill’s actions.
“Mon Dieu! La Trinité?”
Churchill arrived in Antwerp at mid-day on 3 October, wearing the uniform of an Elder Brother of Trinity House (Britain’s lighthouse service), distinguished by a naval cap with badge and pea jacket. A Belgian officer asked what this get-up signified. Churchill replied, in his lame French: “Moi, je suis un frère aîné de la Trinité.”
The astonished Belgian exclaimed: “Mon Dieu! La Trinité?”10 He had misunderstood Churchill to have proclaimed himself divine—a story that would not be lost on critics who believed Churchill thought of himself in that way.
An eye-witness described the scene as Churchill drove out to inspect the defences:
It was a chilly day and he [had changed into] a long black overcoat with broad Astrakhan collar and his usual black top hat, and swung his silver-topped walking stick. In his customary manner, he completely ignored the enemy fire from howitzers, rifles and machine guns and astonished the Belgian troops by taking complete charge of the situation, criticizing the siting of guns and trenches and emphasizing his points by waving his stick or thumping the ground with it. He then climbed back into his car, waiting impatiently to be driven to the next section of the front line.
Later, when the reinforcing Royal Marines arrived and were settled in, Winston came along to inspect them, dressed suitably for this more maritime occasion: “enveloped in a cloak, and on his head wore a yachtsman’s cap,” observed an accompanying journalist. “He was tranquilly smoking a large cigar and looking at the progress of the battle under a rain of shrapnel which I can only call fearful.”11
Churchill’s offer
By 5 October neither French territorials, nor British troops, nor the designated on-scene commander, General Rawlinson, had shown up. There was no leader at all, save Churchill. In what seemed to him an emergency, but with an impulse for which he was later ridiculed, Churchill cabled Asquith his willingness to resign from the Admiralty to conduct the defense of the city.
Instead of an unsordid sacrifice, this was greeted by Asquith as a piece of glory-seeking. The Prime Minister, who should have had Churchill’s back, remarked privately: “Winston is an ex-Lieutenant of Hussars, and would if his proposal had been accepted, have been in command of two distinguished Major Generals, not to mention Brigadiers, Colonels etc.: while the Navy were only contributing its little brigades.”12
Lieutenant he may have been, but among Asquith’s cabinet, Churchill had had more first-line military experience than anyone else. Also, he had thought more about the business than any of his colleagues. Asquith didn’t bother to add, Martin Gilbert noted, “that those ‘little brigades,’ whose role he minimized, were in fact the only British forces at that moment available for immediate despatch to Antwerp, and that one of them, the marine brigade, constituted at the time the only British force engaged in the city’s defence.”13
An honorable outcome
To Churchill’s face, Asquith was charm itself. He needed him. The First Lord was required at home, the PM told him. When would he return? The answer proved to be: when Rawlinson got to Antwerp.
The general finally showed up late on the 6th, having taken three times as long to arrive as Churchill had. Ironically, Rawlinson left Antwerp shortly after Churchill, having decided further defense was futile.
In the absence of promised French or British reinforcements, “hotchpotch” British defenders, under the command of Major-General Archibald Paris, were ordered by Churchill to continue the defense for as long as possible and to be ready to cross to the west bank rather than surrender. General Paris conducted a gallant defense for three more days. Antwerp formally surrendered on 10 October.14
Surprise reaction
The First Lord returned home believing he had significantly slowed the German advance and prevented the enemy from turning the Allied flank. Instead of a welcome he faced an uproar. Typical was the editorial by H.A. Gwynne of the Morning Post, ironically a newspaper that had once lauded his contributions as a war correspondent. The government, Gwynne wrote, must
keep a tight hand upon their impulsive colleague [and] see that no more mischief of the sort is done…. The attempt to relieve Antwerp by a small force of Marines and Naval Volunteers was a costly blunder, for which Mr. W. Churchill must be held responsible….
Is it not true that the energies of Mr. W. Churchill have been directed upon this eccentric expedition, and that he has been using the resources of the Admiralty as if he were personally responsible for the naval operations?… Mr. Churchill’s colleagues…should, quite firmly and definitely, tell the First Lord that on no account are the military and naval operations to be conducted or directed by him.”15
Facts are stubborn things, and the facts say otherwise. In no case did Churchill advance “strategical fancies,” or deploy troops without approval of Lord Kitchener. The object was never the “relief” of Antwerp. The object was to delay and harass the enemy, forestalling a greater disaster.
Royal Naval Division brigades were closest and easiest to transport, and acquitted themselves well, with only fifty-seven deaths out of 8000. Kitchener and Rawlinson (in a foretaste of Gallipoli) had dawdled and failed to deliver. The French had failed utterly. It was Asquith and the Admiralty, with Kitchener’s approval, who had sent recruits—which Churchill had asked not be used.
King Albert’s verdict
As a government minister, Churchill could not reply to all this, and he was not defended by Asquith or Kitchener. The truth was declared, belatedly, by the King of the Belgians. In a letter to General Paris in March 1918, which he later dictated as a memorandum, King Albert wrote:
You are wrong in considering the Royal Naval Division Expedition as a forlorn hope. In my opinion it rendered great service to us and those who deprecate it simply do not understand the history of the War in its early days. Only one man of all your people had the prevision of what the loss of Antwerp would entail and that man was Mr. Churchill….
Delaying an enemy is often of far greater service than the defeat of the enemy, and in the case of Antwerp the delay the Royal Naval Division caused to the enemy was of inestimable service to us. These three days allowed the French and British Armies to move northwest. Otherwise, our whole army might have been captured and the Northern French Ports secured by the enemy. Moreover, the advent of the Royal Naval Division inspired our troops, and owing to your arrival, and holding out for three days, great quantities of supplies were enabled to be destroyed. You kept a large army employed, and I repeat, the Royal Naval Division rendered a service we shall never forget.16
Endnotes
1 Max Hastings, Catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War (New York: Knopf, 2014), 446-55.
2 Ibid.
3 Chris Baker, “The British Army 1914-1918,” in The Long, Long Trail, accessed 14 March 2016.
4 Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. 3, The Challenge of War 1914-1916 (Hillsdale, Mich.: Hillsdale College Press, 2008), 48.
5 See Winston S. Churchill, “Military Aspects of the Continental Problem,” in The World Crisis 1911-1914 (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1923), 60-64.
6 Gilbert, Challenge of War, 104.
7 Ibid.
8 H.H. Asquith, Memories and Reflections 1852-1927, 2 vols. (Boston: Little Browne, 1928), I: 41.
9 Gilbert, Challenge of War, 131.
10 Richard M. Langworth, Churchill by Himself (New York: Rosetta Books, 2015), 524.
11 Richard Hough, Winston and Clementine: The Triumph of the Churchills (London: Bantam, 1991), 288.
12 Henry Pelling, Winston Churchill (1974), revised and extended softbound edition (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1999), 184.
13 Gilbert, Challenge of War, 113-14.
14 J.E. Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium, 1914, vol. 1, Mons, the Retreat to the Seine, the Marne and the Aisne August–October 1914. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence (London: Macmillan, 1926, second edition), 46-48.
15 H.A. Gwynne, “The Antwerp Blunder,” Morning Post, London, 13 October 1914, in Gilbert, Challenge of War, 125-26.
16 Ibid., 125.
For The World Crisis (4), click here