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“The World Crisis” (2): The Marne and Its Meaning
- By GWEN THOMPSON
- | January 29, 2024
- Category: Books
Hillsdale Dialogues: The World Crisis
The Hillsdale Dialogues are weekly broadcasts of discussions between Hillsdale College President Larry P. Arnn and commentator Hugh Hewitt. They are currently involved in an extended discussion of Churchill’s The World Crisis: his outstanding memoir of the First World War. Written contributions to the discussion, like this one on the Marne, follow the dialogues as presented. (Parenthetical references are to the Rosetta Books e-book edition, 2013; see bibliographic note.) To search for all published essays to date, click here.
Reader note: The previous chapter-by-chapter discussion ceases here as Chapters 13-14 of Volume I are skipped in favor of the Battle of the Marne. This was Churchill’s major revision to his account, added to his texts beginning in 1931. It may also be found in the Rosetta e-book.
Audio: World Crisis Dialogue 14: The Marne
Churchill’s Marne account
“The Word Crisis contains two of the finest battle pieces which Churchill ever wrote, that on the battle of the Marne and that on the battle of Jutland…. When I first read Churchill’s descriptions of these two battles—so clear, so concise, and so persuasive—some twenty-five years ago, they made an indelible impression upon my mind; I cannot believe that anyone who enjoys the reading of history can fail even now to be excited by them…. Churchill himself, writing before the Great War, had forecast that within twenty days of its outbreak the French would be driven back towards Paris and that within forty days they would be able to launch a counter-offensive, and this was what happened.” —Maurice Ashley1
Opportunity and divine favor
“One must suppose upon the whole that the Marne was the greatest battle ever fought in the world,” Winston Churchill wrote in 1931. Its scale, he added, “far exceeded anything that has ever happened.” It actually “decided the World War,” for “never after the Marne had Germany a chance of absolute triumph” (Churchill’s The World Crisis Volume I: 273-74).
On 5-12 September 1914, the French (with some help from the British) stopped the German advance toward Paris at the River Marne. It was the first successful repulse of the German advance and the first victory for the Triple Entente (France, Britain, Russia). In Churchill’s analysis, the Marne did not promise ultimate victory to either side. It was instead an assurance that the Entente might not lose. Two predominant themes emerge in Churchill’s account: his admiration for leaders who recognize and act on opportunity; and his respect for Providence in creating those opportunities.
“Numbers and speed”
The Schleiffen Plan was a key strategic element of the war’s beginning. It was conceived by two chiefs of the German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder and Alfred von Schlieffen.2 Observing what Sir Martin Gilbert called “the gradual drawing together, in agreements and conversations, of France, Russia, and Britain,” the German plan anticipated simultaneous fighting against Russia in the East and France in the West.3 Because France’s nerve center (Paris) was nearer than Russia’s to the German border, the Schlieffen Plan was to send the majority of German forces to France. The aim was to conquer France in six weeks, freeing Germany for a longer struggle on her Eastern front. “If the first principle of the Schlieffen plan was NUMBERS,” Churchill wrote, “the second was SPEED” (Churchill’s The World Crisis: The Aftermath, Volume V: 75).
The plan was risky, but as Churchill noted, “every sacrifice [would] be made and every risk accepted” (V: 72). The Plan’s anticipation of a two-front war was the best of bad options, for such wars tend to be long. Churchill did not fault the concept itself. “To this day,” he argued, “no one can say that the Schlieffen Plan was wrong” (I: 213). Instead, he objected to its execution under Moltke the Younger (Chief of the German General Staff, 1906-1914). This Moltke assigned twenty percent more troops to the Eastern front than the Plan stipulated. “These reservations were fatal,” Churchill wrote. “[A]s will be seen the Schlieffen Plan applied at four-fifths of its intensity just failed” (I: 213).
“Whatever might happen to Paris”
Churchill the statesman was a risk-taker. He had commanded the Admiralty as it was preparing for war, but ship production was a slow procedure. Thus, his critical decisions lagged in implementation for months or even years. Yet Churchill understood the need to invest resources in uncertain projects that might take time. To him, Moltke’s inability to commit to a sound strategy because of its risks was not caution; it was cowardice.
Early on, Churchill criticized the French response to the Schlieffen Plan as based not on practical “numbers, distances and times,” but on élan, the French martial tradition of spirit and the offensive (I: 213). He considered the incorporation of emotions or pride into strategy foolhardy. Churchill urged the French to “sell the Germans piece by piece a certain amount of ground for disproportionate losses.” This would overstretch their supply lines while the French backed into well-prepared fortifications (I: 213-14). The French could launch a counterattack once they gained better ground.
Instead, “though the Germans invaded, it was more often the French who attacked.” The “magnificent fighting fury for which the French nation has been traditionally renowned” was quelled (I: 216). A tactic based on national pride rather than France’s strategic situation failed. As the French retreated, Churchill feared they “would turn too soon and make their new effort before the German thrust had reached its full extension” (I: 224).
Churchill was therefore glad when he learned that French plans for the defense of Paris were based on its strategic, not symbolic, importance. This, he wrote, “showed a determination to continue the war whatever might happen to Paris” (I: 214). That would prove a marked contrast to French attitudes in the Second World War.
“The largest fortress in the world”
As the Germans neared Paris, they confronted “not only the heart of France,” but “the largest fortress in the world” (I: 270). The Schlieffen Plan specified passing between Paris and Verdun, destroying France’s armies on the other side. Moltke, thinking the battle already won, began to consider the next part of the Plan: the pivot eastward (I: 225). He transferred two army corps to the East, where Russia was attacking in response to the war in France. Churchill viewed this as one of the fateful decisions of the Marne.
On the day Moltke moved two corps eastward, French General Staff Chief General Joseph Joffre ordered his troops to prepare for the offensive. Adolphe Messimy, the French Minister of War, then intervened. (“Observe the intrusion of politics into the military sphere,” Churchill wrote wryly.) Messimy ordered Joffre to leave at least three corps to defend Paris (I: 227). Churchill watched as “the blind force of events decreed” that the selected army, under French General Michel-Joseph Maunoury,“should be directed on Paris, there to become the sword of General Joseph Gallièni,” the Paris military governor (I: 228).
By August 31st, German forces (in accordance with their plan to pass between Paris and Verdun) were redirecting towards Compiègne. It was here that Gallièni saw an opportunity to strike. In contrast to Moltke, and like a man after Churchill’s own heart, Gallièni began to move.
“He thinks for France”
Maurice Ashley mentioned a criticism that Churchill gave “too much credit for the victory to General Gallièni…. It is asserted that it was always the intention of Marshal Joffre to counter-attack the Germans after they had outrun their line of communications.”4 But Churchill was not writing of possibilities, only facts. He saw in Gallièni “the saviour of France,” and possibly the hand of Providence: “No human hand had conceived the design, nor had human hand set the pieces on the board” (I: 271).
Galliéni’s location was not only perfect, but also contrary to the plan: “Fixed in his fortress, he could not move towards the battle; so the mighty battle has been made to come to him.” Another chess piece was Maunoury’s army, which Gallièni would use to save Joffre. A third was what Churchill called “The Opportunity”: In bypassing Paris, the Germans laid their “whole right flank and rear” open to Gallièni’s three corps (I: 271).
In August, Churchill had sent the Fleet to its war station without waiting for authorization. Likewise, Gallièni on his own authority instructed Maunoury’s troops to strike. Churchill approved of this energetic, offensive spirit. “He vibrates with enthusiasm,” Churchill wrote, recording Galliéni racing from one commander to the next, seeking the cooperation of Joffre and British commander Sir John French. “Remember that this man had had Joffre under his command in Madagascar,” Churchill wrote, “and that he is his formally designated successor…. He is not thinking only of the local situation around Paris. He thinks for France, and he behaves with the spontaneous confidence of genius in action” (I: 271-72). Gallièni was a hero in Churchill’s eyes.
“The Battle of the Marne has begun”
Far less confident, Joffre approved the use of Maunoury’s army, but ordered Gallièni to stay south of the Marne. Unbeknown to Churchill and the British, Joffre was already in favor of surrendering Paris and Verdun (I: 272).
Gallièni wished to strike the Germans on September 5th, but on the night of the 4th he still had only Maunoury’s troops. He called Joffre. The two “spoke at least as equals; and Joffre, to his honour, rising above jealousies and formalities, felt the strong, clear guidance of his valiant comrade. He agreed that Gallièni should attack north of the Marne on the 5th, and returning to his circle of officers, ordered the general battle for the 6th.” It was 3 a.m. before Sir John French knew what was happening, but the stage was set. Churchill exulted: “The famous order of the day is sent out; and from Verdun to Paris the electrifying right-about-turn points a million bayonets and 1000 cannon upon the invading hosts. The Battle of the Marne has begun” (I: 273).
The Entente forces were now in the situation for which Churchill had long advised the French to wait. Writing later, Churchill contrasted this arrangement to the spirited, impulsive engagements the French had initiated before. The Marne campaign was not a “leopard spring at the throat of the invaders,” but a disciplined and prudent maneuver. Halting their retreat, the French turned to form a wall against the enemy. “If only the French had done this at the frontiers,” Churchill wrote. “[I]f only they had used modern firearms upon hostile flesh and blood at the outset, how different the picture of the world might look today!” (I: 276).
“The shadow of a great name”
Churchill portrayed the Marne victory as the natural result of a brilliant commander’s attack against an imprudent one: “The battle of the Marne was won when Joffre had finished his conversation with Gallièni on the night of September 4” (I: 276). Of the ninety-seven divisions in France which the Schlieffen Plan prescribed, Moltke had sent seventy-eight. The rest were in the East. Later he sent away the infamous two additional corps. In their eagerness and confidence, the Germans had relaxed their guard, and could not reform in time. They left a thirty-mile gap between their two main contingents. That was perfect, Churchill noted with sarcasm, for two corps to fill.
The British led a march into the gap, driving a wedge between the two German contingents. Here, Churchill believed, a great commander might have saved the Germans. But Moltke was “the shadow of a great name…. A good, harmless, respectable, ordinary man. And on to this ill-fated being crashes the brutal, remorseless, centripetal impingement of tides and impulsions under which the greatest captains of history might have blenched!” Had Moltke held his ground, the wedge might have grown into “a dangerous salient, a bulge subject to crossfire and counterattack from both flanks” (I: 282). Instead, Moltke ordered a retreat, and the Germans lost the battle.
Thus ended also the Schlieffen Plan. Under Moltke, Churchill wrote, it had changed to “a compromise which defaced and in the event destroyed the original conception” (V: 75). Upon it had hinged all of the Central Powers’ goals. Now they were forced to recalculate their distribution of focus between the East and West.
“The Schleiffen Plan is burnt out”
The strategic consequences for both sides were great. General Conrad, head of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, insisted that “the Schlieffen Plan is burnt out. Smash Russia. Hold Austria up. Crush Serbia. Rally the Balkans and join hands with Turkey” (V:238). The Marne was affecting the plans of yet-uncommitted spectator states, like Italy and Romania. Churchill even implies that the awful stalemate of trench warfare was a product of the Marne and its resultant squabbles.
The argument over the respective merits of a Western or Eastern campaign split the Central Powers’ planners. Moltke was replaced by Erich von Falkenhayn as Chief of the General Staff within days of the Marne. Falkenhayn, a “westerner,” could not escape internal strife. Kaiser Wilhelm chose the East, and in early 1915 Falkenhayn was forced to resign as Minister of War, though he remained Chief of Staff for the time through August 1916.
The Entente allies had their own East-West arguments. As First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill considered a breakthrough in the West implausible. He too argued for an Eastern focus, supporting an attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula. But the democracies had no Kaiser to break the debate, which proved lengthy. Churchill grumbled: “if the ‘Easterners’ had only to deal with the British army and its Headquarters staff, we could have given them orders.”
But “Joffre, like Falkenhayn, looked only to the Western Front, and like Falkenhayn believed in the superiority of the attack…. Each was sure that he had only to gather a few more army corps and a few more cannon to break the opposing line…. They were of course, as we now know, absolutely out of touch with true facts and values” (V: 244).
“A message full of reassurance”
Churchill’s account of the Marne did not mention God or Providence. Yet he observed that “something of enormous and mysterious potency had worked its will.” God or fate had given Galliéni a golden opportunity. On September 3rd the Germans anticipated success within days. By the 10th, “Moltke informed his master with rugged truth that ‘Germany had lost the war’” (I: 274).
That is why Churchill called the Marne “the greatest battle ever fought in the world.” It was won not only because Gallièni was wise, or because the French army demonstrated admirable strategic flexibility. The Marne inspired awe and humility because, in the face of the most careful and excellent of human plans—the Schlieffen Plan among them—something beyond the powers of men had intervened. And “‘the avalanche of fire and steel’ was… hurled backwards” (I: 274). France escaped destruction.
Churchill refused to name the “something of enormous and mysterious potency.” But here was a man who, on accepting control of the Admiralty, saw fit to quote Deuteronomy 9:3… “Understand therefore this day, that the Lord thy God is he which goeth over before thee; as a consuming fire he shall destroy them, and he shall bring them down before thy face.” Churchill mused later that this seemed “a message full of reassurance” (I: 59).
So too was the Marne.
Bibliographic note
For his 1931 abridged edition of The World Crisis, and in later editions, Churchill added the material referenced parenthetically herein. In his preface to the 1939 Odhams edition he wrote: “All this new matter, which includes pages devoted to the Battle of the Marne, has hitherto appeared in a one-volume edition which was of necessity very considerably abridged. In the present edition, it takes its place for the first time in the complete work. The reader thus obtains a narrative that not only appears in a form far less costly than its earlier issues, but is also fuller and more correct.”5
Endnotes
1 Maurice Ashley, Churchill as Historian (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968), 90.
2 While Sir Martin Gilbert and Churchill agree that Moltke and Schlieffen both contributed to the Plan, they disagree on the nature of that contribution. Cf. Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Complete History (New York: Rosetta, 1994), 38.
3 Ibid., 19.
4 Ashley, 90-91.
5 Ronald I. Cohen, Bibliography of the Writings of Sir Winston Churchill, 3 vols. (London: Continuum, 2006), I: 286.
The author
Gwen Thompson is a junior economics major at Hillsdale College and a Winston Churchill fellow. She studies in the Center for Military History and Grand Strategy, which includes helping staff the Center’s events. She has been a Koch Fellow and is currently Vice President of the Delta Phi Alpha German honorary.
For The World Crisis (3), click here.