William John Shepherd

A good start to Swift’s new series on British Prime Ministers, this book reviews the Churchill saga with useful commentary on such issues as political control of the military and the virtues and pitfalls of consistency in politics. Churchill’s mantra of “One Nation Conservatism,” Caddick-Adams argues, was akin to his father’s “Tory Democracy.”

Churchill’s hatred of Communism is well-known, but he never saw Soviet Russia, and later Communist China, in the same light as Nazi Germany, which he considered beyond negotiations. But Tucker-Jones veers into historical swampland by asserting that Churchill's 1946 “Iron Curtain” speech at Fulton, Missouri, was "paradoxical," if not “hypercritical,” since Churchill claims “sold out” Eastern Europe well before Yalta.

Being out of office was not altogether debilitating. Churchill had more time to write and to earn money, which he always needed. He wrote extensively for four newspapers, and began research for what would be his greatest biography, “Marlborough: His Life and Times.” He published two other books and countless articles, while entertaining guests as varied as film star Charlie Chaplin and suffragette Christabel Pankhurst.

Overall, this book adds little to corpus of Churchillian historiography. Factual errors and unsubstantiated or exaggerated references are particular problems. This book is neither another Churchill polemic nor a woke propaganda piece, but there are better accounts of the Battle of Britain (linked herein). All of them provide more accurate reading.

African leaders like Jomo Kenyatta and Nelson Mandela cited the Atlantic Charter as their inspiration. Ultimately, when accompanied by civil order and democratic institutions, Churchill accepted African independence. Charges of racism are now so perversive as to be a trope, far removed from historical contextualization and based on modern notions of morality. Finely written books like Faught’s go a long way to righting the balance and revealing the truth.

Kershaw explains Hitler’s “halt” order and Germany’s focus on the still formidable and as yet undefeated French army. But his greatest accomplishment is to unpack established historical hindsight by depicting how letters, diaries, and reports of contemporary players reveal on-the-ground realities. This is particularly valuable through his use of overlooked or otherwise unknown German language sources.

Downing does a great job in presenting the story in a near-real time format. This enables the reader to have a better understanding of the impact of intertwining events. His extensive use of Mass-Observation, a compilation of surveys and observations on the concerns of Britons, is illuminating in light of the later hindsight that sometimes approaches dogma. It genuinely adds a new dimension to the monumental Churchill canon.

Andrew Liddle believes today’s Scotland ignores Churchill in part because the hero of 1940 eclipses the memory of his earlier Liberal phase. Also, Churchill is a victim of the constitutional debate that sees him as representing the union with England now resisted by some Scots. Yet Churchill supported Scottish devolution long before it became politically popular.

Brad Faught has given us an expertly researched and thoughtfully argued examination of one of the seminal diplomatic events of the 20th century. He explains why British officials like Curzon and Allenby opposed a Jewish homeland within the Mandate of Palestine. Allenby, aided by Lawrence, was the general who had conquered the Ottoman provinces in the First World War.

Once Churchill became prime minister, ignominious vassalage à la Vichy France was never a serious possibility. But Saltman's psychological profile of why Churchill fought on omits a crucial dimension: Churchill’s belief in constitutional democracy. That didn’t come from his upbringing or the military, but from his wide reading of the classic philosophers, and broad understanding of representative government.

This excellent commentary notes how Gallipoli, the great millstone of failure, was hung round Churchill’s neck, while the Norway campaign, first great failure of the Second World War, was blamed almost entirely upon Chamberlain. Churchill loyally defended the Prime Minister and, in a display of character, tried to take responsibility. But Chamberlain was wrongheaded and arrogant, while Churchill displayed wit and respect for democracy.

Britain was truly overstretched trying to deter Far East attacks with inexperienced troops and second-rate weaponry. That was because all the best soldiers and materials were sorely needed in war against Germany and Italy. And they were spread throughout Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Churchill was very well aware of this. Yet he sent the battleships Prince of Wales and Repulse to Singapore hoping to cow the Japanese. They would act, he said, as “a vague menace.” It is hard to consider such actions—however doomed—efforts to signal British weakness.