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Churchill for Today: His Six Precepts for Confronting Terrorists (Part 2)
- By CHRISTOPHER C. HARMON
- | March 16, 2022
- Category: Churchill for Today Explore Understanding Churchill
Churchill and the terrorist challenge
“I decline utterly to be impartial as between the fire brigade and the fire.” —WSC, 7 July 19261
Continued from Part 1.
It was Winston Churchill’s fate to lose precious friends and colleagues to terrorists. The bitter losses included Captain Francis Cromie, murdered by Bolsheviks in the British Embassy in Petrograd in 1918. Closer and equally lost were General Sir Henry Wilson in London in 1922, and Lord Moyne in Cairo in 1944.
It was likewise recurrent in Churchill’s life—due to politics and to his prominence—that he too was hunted. Terrorists who targeted him included the Irish Republican Army, and San Francisco-based Sikh Indians when he toured the U.S. in 1931. But no one has ever detailed the British statesman’s views on counterterrorism. It may be that we don’t associate him with a prevailing problem today; nevertheless, he thought seriously about it.
1) Principled opposition
Churchill’s thoughts on countering terrorism began with considered principles. In his youth a friend loaned him copy Aristotle’s Ethics. When Churchill returned it, the owner inquired about his reflections. It is very good, Churchill replied, “but it is extraordinary how much of it I had already thought out for myself.”2
Given such a mind, it is unsurprising that Churchill deliberated on this problem and possible solutions. At least six lines of thought emerge from his spare comments on counterterrorism matters over the years.
First, the deliberate murder of civilians for shock—to induce wider fears, for political reasons—is base. Churchill made frequent and appropriate use of the word “terrorists,” and placed them at the bottom of man’s moral ladder. Unlike guerrilla war, which he memorably encouraged against Nazi Europe, terrorism preys on the innocent. The problem drew up this traditionalist statesman’s deep indignation. Even in war, he thought, one begins with determination to exercise discrimination, justice, and in victory, magnanimity. Terrorists attack the weakest, and least limit their use of force.
2) Readiness for counter-action
Second, terrorism was not a problem to be merely contemplated but one needing contrary action. War crimes—and their terrorist equivalents in peacetime—demonstrate raw power and are designed to subdue. Sadly, this may work, making the opposition passive. Churchill determined not just to condemn but to oppose.
Of course, many perpetrators of terrorism escape the reach of the law, or even the army. That was the case with the Bolshevik killers of Capt. Cromie: They disappeared into the swirling unknowns of the nascent Soviet Union. At such times Churchill would mark the moment and announce the determination for future justice:
I earnestly hope that the Government, in spite of its many [First World War] preoccupations, will pursue the perpetrators of this crime with tireless perseverance…. [M]ark down the personalities of the Bolshevik Government as the objects upon whom justice will be executed, however long it takes… The exertions which a nation is prepared to make to protect its individual representatives or citizens from outrage is one of the truest measures of its greatness as an organized state.3
This forecasts Churchill’s position on Nazi war criminals during the Second World War: They should be marked publicly for punishment when that became possible. A related perspective is apparent in U.S. domestic law: There is no statute of limitations for murder and often it takes years to capture a perpetrator. Justice must be tireless in holding up her sword. It should always deter; it may cut; it must never drop from fatigue or inattention.
Roles of governments and populations
Ireland’s Minister for Justice Kevin O’Higgins was murdered by the Irish Republican Army in 1927. Churchill’s eulogy in Mansion House stressed his dignified service to self-government in the new Irish Free State. He would expect Ireland to find and convict the men, compatibly with state sovereignty and its duties to others. When the Irish “Troubles” broke out again in the 1970s, London quietly measured Dublin by its standard of cooperation in denying IRA gunmen safe haven in the south.
Social pressure was also needed and apt. Churchill wanted populations and not just governments to reject terrorist methods. This was visible after Lord Moyne was struck down in Cairo. Churchill expressed satisfaction when the Jewish Agency called on its people to deprive the killers “of all refuge and shelter, to resist their threats, and to render all necessary assistance to Palestinian authorities in the prevention of terrorist acts, and in the eradication of the terrorist organization.”4 Today, Israel attempts to manage the Palestinian terror problem by citizen informants and by pressing authorities in the West Bank and Gaza to contain their own armed terrorists—on the principle that it is their duty to do so.
3) Border controls
Third, Churchill attended to the United Kingdom’s borders. Then as now, many perpetrators were alien or transient. Whenever war loomed, enemy agents and saboteurs were a related and stronger worry. And these two threats could merge, as when German agents during the world wars labored to assist Irish Republican Army operations, and in 1939, when the IRA was liaising with German intelligence.5
Loyalists based in the northern Irish counties were active and at times threatening. In 1914, Loyalists clandestinely landed three million cartridges and 30,000 rifles. Distributed to Ulster’s Protestants, they posed a grave threat to civil authority.6
As Home Secretary in 1910-11 and First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911-15 Churchill had authority over maritime borders. On dry land the combined threats meant need of good policing. David Stafford’s unique book Churchill and Secret Service shows his devotion to intelligence as an aid in policing and military operations.
Administrative control (or lack thereof) of non-citizens was a particular concern in the early 20th century. Here Churchill’s position was not constant. It was affected by his shifting allegiances as between Tory and Liberal parties. He held back from supporting a 1904 Aliens Bill, concerned for people who were poor but not hostile. Two years on he supported another Aliens Bill, and the issue was still percolating in Parliament a few years later.
Prudence and principle
Circumstances always played alongside principles in Churchill’s mind. His votes were affected by prudential judgements about crime, terrorism, war dangers, and what other European states were doing. He favored intelligence officials’ wish for an aliens registry, but did not seek Parliamentary approval for it until war with Germany in 1914.7
In border control, states of the early 1900s had no help by international supporting agencies. Even allies had functional troubles if they wished to cooperate. Britain had no secret service until 1909. About the same time, America finally began creating a bureau of investigations under the Attorney General. Bilateral treaties of use against international crimes were few and had loopholes. Interpol did not exist until 1923. Until 9/11 and Secretary General Ronald Noble, Interpol deliberately stayed clear of political crimes such as terrorism. Churchill supported both the League of Nations and the United Nations, but they aimed to deter war or foster talks on global problems. Neither had authority or interest to police individuals or international terrorists.
4) Holding suspects within
Arrest, detention, and deportation were issues for Churchill, as a cabinet official or MP. Here was a fourth arena for his attention. When it came to fellow citizens, his principles bent him ever towards the Latin language phrase “habeas corpus,” or ‘show me the body,’ a millennium-old English legal tool that might withdraw someone from unfair detention or jailing. In the Second World War, indigenous fascists were a public threat. Yet even then, Churchill locked them up with reluctance, and freed most before war’s end.
When the threat was powerful, however, Churchill was moved by circumstances to restrain liberties in certain sectors. One does not see written protests by him on terrorist cases and detention within the UK. After the O’Higgins murder, Ireland debated a Public Safety Act enhancing powers to detain suspected IRA terrorists. Apparently the policy drew no objections from Churchill.8 Later on, the legal tangle detaining terrorism suspects before (or without) trial would roil many, whether citizens or foreigners.
Deportation
Churchill’s prudence showed in his disdain for deportation of terrorists. The late 19th and 20th centuries saw over-use of this primitive tool of law enforcement. Churchill was wise to question it. Anyone might ask: if there is no evidence of terrorism, why deport? If there is evidence, why not jail instead of merely deporting? Yet in anarchism cases—where internationalist ideology and the rootlessness of many practitioners saw an immense spread of the problem transnationally—deportation by states was as common as it was inconclusive. European states, Russia, and the U.S. frequently deported alien terrorists and revolutionary conspirators.
The futility of such half-measures was noted by Churchill in a speech on “Palestine Terrorism” in 1944. Faced with killings by Irgun and Lehi (Stern Gang), Palestinian-British authorities were making arrests. In one move, “251 were deported from the country…” But to relocate the problem was not to solve it. Deportations, Churchill declared, “only led to increased insecurity” and future (re)arrests. What was needed? Fulsome prevention of terrorism by community and state, and “eradication of the terrorist organization.”9
5) Using force when appropriate
A fifth principle evolved in Churchill’s thoughts and practices: Force can be fully appropriate in countering terrorism—if well-considered and discriminating. The abject immorality of terrorism rarely spurred Churchill to bloodlust. He once noted grimly how countering what we now call “low intensity” threats could lead British armed forces into ambiguous and messy situations in which they could not show well. But he could support force in policing. And in some cases he favored counterinsurgency, often where terrorist excesses had come to the fore.
In Northern Ireland Churchill too long supported the “Black and Tans.” This muscular special police force did great damage as well as justice. He wrote that Feinians training gatherings might be dispersed by machine gun fire from aircraft. In Iraq, he favored air power to defeat hostile armed gatherings. But when civilians or women were victimized he drew back and cautioned the military.10
Reading this now reminds us of British cooperation with U.S. air strikes on Libyan terrorist training camps and Col. Moammar Qaddafi’s headquarters in 1986. This followed notable anti-British outrages by Libyans. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher argued that this was a simple case of self-defense.
During Churchill’s 1951-55 administration, “Communist Terrorists” (CTs) beset British Malaya. The P.M. fully supported the well-integrated martial, police, and civic operations championed by senior appointees Harold Briggs and Gerald Templer. This permitted eventual British withdrawal and the independence of Malaysia.
Force against terrorism, as Churchill projected it, should be considered, supported by intelligence, and discriminating. “Combatants are fair game,” even if “sometimes non-combatants get injured through their proximity.” Outside full-dress war between nation-states, assault on civilians or non-belligerents must remain impermissible.
6) Talking to terrorists…
Might one negotiate with terrorists? This has become a prime sub-field within terrorism studies for our last decade. Analysts led by British expert Jonathan Powell favor talks. While Churchill never wrote at length on the matter, his views on relating power to parlay are well-known, giving us a sixth point for consideration. With a respected opponent, Churchill kept open the prospect of talking before or even during conflict. Negotiating with Hitler in 1939-45 was a well-judged exception, based on the extent of evil in the man and the Nazi threat to the world.
Modern terrorists have public profiles and usually proceed by a “fight and talk” strategy, whether genuine or dishonest. The IRA did so, starting with the Irish Treaty Churchill, Michael Collins and others negotiated in 1921. In subsequent decades the IRA usually advanced a “bullets and ballots” line that allowed occasional secret or public talks with London. This prevailed to the late 1990s when American officials and interlocuters were assisting the negotiations. But it is obvious that such talks give an enemy credibility, and other problems may emerge. Could the damage be worth it?
Entering talks from a strong government position was a leading Churchill precondition. Negotiating out of weakness was a strategic error and gave “appeasement” a bad name in the 1930s. But appeasement from strength, he said, could be virtuous and magnanimous. In Malaysia, Britain appeased as well as pressed and punished; battle was offered but so too was future independence, if the enemy quit. This combination worked. “War down the strong and bear up the weak” was a Roman maxim the Prime Minister admired.11 It had meaning during talks, not just after a conquest.
…And when not to talk
Sensible interlocutors were another sine quo non. Terrorists acting as an arm of insurgency—insurgents who held ground—might be different from individual Anarchists or clandestine factions. “Democracy is no harlot to be picked up on the street by a man with a tommy gun,” Churchill once told the House of Commons. There were parties he would not talk to. Yet his context for the above remark was the Greek Civil War, infamous for communist terror. Understanding how and why the communists were organized, Churchill accepted great risk and did meet with insurgent representatives in person in Athens, hoping all the Greek parties might make an accord. They did. The Prime Minister’s intervention helped re-secure a country he admired as the birthplace of democracy.
Indeed, Churchill’s anti-terrorism was as strong as it was because of the good he envisioned displacing terror. He was an irrepressible idealist about the prospects of lawful civic order and good governance. We see it in the fuller passage from his House of Commons oration, as Greek lives lay in the balance amidst two wars in 1944:
Democracy, I say, is not based on violence or terrorism, but on reason, on fair play, on freedom, on respecting other people’s rights as well as their ambitions…. I trust the people, the mass of the people, in almost any country, but I like to make sure that it is the people and not a gang of bandits… who think that by violence they can overturn constituted authority, in some cases ancient Parliaments, Governments and States.12
Endnotes
1 Winston S. Churchill (hereinafter WSC), House of Commons, 7 July 1926, in Richard M. Langworth, ed., Churchill by Himself: The Definitive Collection of Quotations (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 402.
2 Lord Birkenhead, “The Force of Sheer Genius” (1924), excerpted in Martin Gilbert, Churchill, Great Lives Observed Series (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1987), 113.
3 This incident is reported just once by Martin Gilbert; see his Winston S. Churchill, Vol. 4, The Stricken World 1917-1922 (Hillsdale, Mich.: Hillsdale College Press, 2008), 225.
4 WSC, 17 November 1944, in The Dawn of Liberation (London: Cassell, 1945), 251-52.
5 David Stafford, Churchill and Secret Service (New York: Overlook Press, 1987), 162-63. Stafford believes Churchill sometimes exaggerated security threats or overreacted to certain intelligence reports.
6 Randolph S. Churchill, editorial remarks in The Churchill Documents, vol. 5, At the Admiralty 1911-1914 (Hillsdale College Press, 2007), 1416 and previous pages.
7 Stafford, Churchill and Secret Service, 34-35.
8 This is apparently the case, based upon papers available in the official biography, e.g. Martin Gilbert, ed., The Churchill Documents, vol. 11, The Exchequer Years, 1922-1927, 1029.
9 WSC, House of Commons, 17 November 1944, in The Dawn of Liberation, 252.
10 WSC to Hugh Trenchard, 22 July 1921, in Martin Gilbert, ed., The Churchill Documents, vol. 10, Conciliation and Reconstruction, April 1921-November 1922 (Hillsdale College Press, 2008), 1561.
11 Reportedly there is another common translation, “Spare the conquerors and war down the proud,” a Latin slogan in Virgil’s Aeneid, VI, 853. See Langworth, Churchill by Himself, 481.
12 WSC, House of Commons, 8 December 1944, in Larry P. Arnn and Martin Gilbert, eds., The Churchill Documents, vol. 20, Normandy and Beyond May-December 1944 (Hillsdale College Press, 2018), 2136.
The author
Dr. Harmon authored successive editions of A Citizen’s Guide to Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Routledge, 2014; 2021). He teaches related courses—and another on military strategy—at the Institute of World Politics, Washington, D.C.