Raymond A. Callahan

“David Lloyd George's personal failings are clear, but a historian’s verdict ought to be that, in utterly unprecedented situations, he rose very well to the challenges—and far better than any conceivable alternative leader. Overshadowed now by the memory of Churchill, he deserves respectful remembrance in his own right.”

Although it commands less historical attention than some of the war’s later “summits,” Arcadia was very important. It brought together for the first time the small group that, sustainably unchanged, would manage the largest, most complex coalition war in recorded history. It also shaped the Allies’ controlling machinery and grand strategy. Without it, effective Anglo-American cooperation and coordination would have been much harder, if not impossible.

Versailles is often viewed as short-sighted and vindictive, laying the foundation for future calamity. But Lloyd George was under enormous pressure to satisfy clamant allies whose mood was either deeply angry (France) or unrealistically messianic (America). At home, the Tories wanted a harsh peace. Churchill, still a Liberal and characteristically magnanimous, argued vainly for milder treatment of Germany.

The first thing to know about Lloyd George’s premiership is that it destroyed the Liberal Party. Internecine fighting opened the door for the Labour Party (which joined the wartime coalition). A few years later, moving from minor third-party status, Labour formed a government. The Liberals would never govern again.

Much of Churchill’s pre-1914 career was tied into that of Lloyd George, who kick-started the rebuilding of that career in 1917. The memory of Lloyd George’s experience as war leader helped shape how Churchill structured his own position in 1940. Lloyd George’s career is worth remembering for its own sake, and for its impact on Churchill, who led Britain through a second and greater total war.

“He’d never get us killed, stupid like…” Britain’s soldiers needed a general who wouldn't squander their lives. In Montgomery they found one.

Montgomery took command of the 8th Army at a time when Britain and Churchill desperately needed a victory. It was left to him to deliver it.

London has no statue of Claude Auchinleck, the man who stopped Rommel and the last commander of the Indian Army. Perhaps there should be one.

Auchinleck met seemingly impossible challenges in running up a noble record in North Africa and India during the Second World War.

Churchill believed any obstacle could be surmounted, while Wavell prepared for the worst. Both traits had served Britain well.

Confronted with the seeming impossible in the Middle East, Wavell acquitted himself well and was promoted as often as he was sacked.

Rachel Trethewey adds an important family dimension, reflecting the mutual devotion between Churchill and his three daughters.