Churchill in WWII

It’s not unusual for leaders with powerful egos and passionate views to prefer the company and advice of close and trusted friends over that of professional advisors or experienced experts. This can have positive results, perhaps shaking up a moribund bureaucracy or forcing radical new approaches to issues mired in the mud of conventional thinking. But it can also lead to disillusion or disaster. Fateful Questions, September 1943 to April 1944, volume 19 in Hillsdale’s series of The Churchill Documents, provides many examples of how Churchill’s decision-making was favorably influenced by close advisors.

A popular weekly half hour podcast, Revisionist History takes aim at shibboleths, real and imagined. This episode is Churchill’s turn in the barrel. The villain, aside from Sir Winston, is his scientific adviser, Frederick Lindemann, later Lord Cherwell, aka “The Prof.” You’ve probably never heard of him, says narrator Malcolm Gladwell. You should have. It was Lindemann who made Churchill bomb innocent German civilians and starve the Bengalis. Accompanied by background music, uplifting or ominous as required, Mr. Gladwell unfolds his case. He claims to have read six books on Lord Cherwell (whose title he mispronounces). But his only two quoted sources are the British scientist C.P. Snow (very selectively; Snow admired Churchill); and Madhusree Mukerjee, author of a widely criticized book on the Bengal Famine. There are no contrary opinions or evidence.

Dunkirk, produced by Christopher Nolan, sets out to portray the 1940 rescue of the Allied armies from the clutches of Hitler’s Wehrmacht in terms of courage, heroism, survival, and a few examples of cowardice. In that he succeeds admirably. In terms of context—in conveying an understanding of what Dunkirk was about—he fails utterly.

During the war, Britain had a fairly strict internment policy for incoming foreigners. Churchill certainly acknowledged the wisdom of carefully vetting incomers for enemy agents. However, Churchill quickly began to deplore the broad policy of interning refugees and foreigners, and firmly believed that no one should be imprisoned without just cause.

After the surrender of Italy to the Allies in September 1943, the Italian Fleet was apportioned between the Allied powers and absorbed into their navies. Although the Axis had by then been cleared out of the Mediterranean, German forces having surrendered in Tunis that May, the ships played a significant part in the rest of the war. Negotiations regarding the apportioning of the Italian Fleet, in volume 19 of Hillsdale’s "The Churchill Documents," Fateful Questions, September 1943 to April 1944, provide a fascinating backdrop and insight into relations between Britain, America and Russia leading up to the November 1943 Teheran Conference and its aftermath.

The longest biography in history takes a long step to completion with publication of The Churchill Documents, Vol. 19, Fateful Questions, September 1943-April 1944. Fastidiously compiled by the late Sir Martin Gilbert and edited by Dr. Larry Arnn, these 2700 pages serve up another fresh contribution of documents crucial to our understanding of Churchill in World War II. It is a vast new contribution to Churchill scholarship.

William Courtenay achieved immortality with his films of living history. In the wake of recent events in Paris and Brussels, they are a timely reminder of MacArthur’s words: “In war, there is no substitute for victory.”

The Churchillian way of high command rests on an uneven dialogue between civilian leader and military chiefs. It is neither comfortable for the military nor easy for the civilians but in the end, it is difficult to quarrel with the results.

Of all the responsibilities that come the way of statesmen at war, the most important may be the selection of those who direct the armies and fleets. Few cares rest heavier on a war leader, and few present greater difficulties. In the case of deciding on a major operation, a war statesmen can consult his own right reason and reams of planning and intelligence material; he has the benefit of advice prepared by large staffs, and he can turn to a variety of experts for their views.

"Churchill’s profound sense of the uncertainties inherent in war suggests that he would have found the notion that one could have a blueprint for victory at any time before say 1943 an absurdity, bred of unfamiliarity with the very nature of war."

I have sent a few emails asking why Churchill sold Eastern Europe to Stalin. ​Eastern Europeans do not look admiringly at Mr. Churchill...like my father who fought with the British, in his Polish uniform.

Idealism is not enough. Universality is not a solution. There is the problem of power, and that is what this war is about. In arranging for a new world organisation we shall have to provide not only for freedom and democracy but also for leadership and power.